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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Was the Appellant's right to a fair trial and 
right to effective assistance of counsel violated as a result 
of the prosecution's failure to comply with its promise to 
fulfill the requests contained in the Appellant's motion to 
discover? 
2. Did the trial court err in refusing to sever the 
co-defendants? 
3. Did the trial court err in refusing to grant 
Appellant's motion for mistrial after the jury heard statements 
that the Appellant had been in prison and was on parole at the 
time of his arrest? 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs. 
JOHNNIE PATRICK KNIGHT, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20670 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment against Johnnie 
Patrick Knight for aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302 (1953 as amended). 
A jury found him guilty following a trial on March 12-13, 1985, 
in the Third District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, the Honorable David B. Dee, Judge, presiding. He was 
committed to the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term 
of five years to life. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 2, 1984, the One-Hour Martinizing Cleaners 
located at 1689 South West Temple was robbed of approximately 
$85.50 (T. I at 52,58,65-66). The manager, Bruce Andersen, and 
another employee, Teresa Jensen, were present in the cleaners 
as the robbery was committed (T. I at 52). Mr. Andersen testified 
that two men, both wearing dark hats and sweaters and bandanas 
over their faces, entered the cleaners from the rear door, an 
entrance for employees and salesmen only (T. I at 53). One of 
the men had a revolver-type pistol, and the other had a solid 
blade hunting knife (T. I at 54). Mr. Andersen was forced to 
lie on the floor while Ms. Jensen opened the cash register 
till. She was then told to lie beside Mr. Andersen (T. I at 
55-56). The man with the gun then reached down and took Mr. 
Andersen's checkbook and wallet from his back pocket and cut 
the telephone cord. The two men then fled (T. I at 56). 
Ms. Jensen testified that just moments before the 
robbery a man had walked into the cleaners through the 
front customer entrance (T. I at 65). He asked for directions 
and then left. She identified Jeff Richens through a police 
photo lineup as the man (T. I at 65). Mr. Richens had admitted 
taking part in the robbery and was the State's primary eyewitness 
(T. II at 41). Neither Ms. Jensen nor Mr. Andersen were able to 
identify either of the masked robbers, although Ms. Jensen said 
that she could see blonde hair below the cap that one of the men 
was wearing (T. I at 69). 
Christopher Laub, a motorist who happened to be driving 
along West Temple at the time, saw the men as they ran out of the 
cleaners (T. I at 74). He followed in his car as the men ran 
down the middle of West Temple and then down an alley to a car 
(T. I at 75). He testified that there was a person with long hair 
whom he thought was a woman get out of the car in order to let one of 
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the fleeing men into the back seat (T. I at 75-76). Mr. Laub 
wrote down the license plate number of the car he observed 
(T. I at 77). This car, later found in West Valley, was 
registered to Kim Richens, the wife of Jeff Richens (T. I 
at 93) . 
Jeffery Richens testified for the State in return for 
a guilty plea to attempted robbery, after admitting involvement 
in the cleaner's robbery (T. II at 41). Also Richens acknow-
ledged that he had prior robbery and burglary convictions 
(T. II at 41). 
During his testimony Richens said that he, the 
Appellant Johnnie Knight, and a co-defendant Joseph Ridlon 
met at Richens' apartment on February 2, 1984 (T. II at 43). 
He testified that they left the apartment about mid-morning in 
his wife's car for the purpose of casing out possible businesses 
to rob (T. II at 44). Mr. Richens stated that he dropped off 
Mr. Knight and Mr. Ridlon at approximately 300 West and 1700 South, 
and then drove to an alley where he parked, and remained in the 
car for about fifteen minutes, at which time the Appellant and 
Ridlon came running back to the car, Ridlon carrying a sack of 
money (T. II at 50). Richens testified that he then drove the 
three men to an apartment complex where Ridlonrs girlfriend 
lived (T. II at 53). After a few minutes Richens and the 
Appellant left the apartment on foot and met shortly thereafter 
at a small grocery store, where they called a friend of the 
Appellantfs who came and picked the men up (T. II at 54-55). 
Ron Nelson, a robbery detective with the Salt Lake 
City Police Department, testifed that the day of the robbery he 
was dispatched to a housing project in West Valley City to 
investigate a suspect vehicle (T. I at 91). Detective Nelson 
found the driver's license and Visa charge card belonging to 
Bruce Andersen, the manager of the cleaners, in the back 
seat of the car (T. I at 92). After obtaining permission from 
Kim Richens, the owner of the car, Detective Nelson opened the 
trunk of the car (T. I at 96-97). In the trunk he found several 
animal traps, miscellaneous tools, miscellaneous clothing, and 
a wallet belonging to Johnnie Knight (T. I at 97-98). There 
was no money in the wallet (T. I at 98). Detective Nelson 
seized these items. 
On February 6, 1984, Detective Nelson personally 
questioned the Appellant in connection with the robbery, after 
which the Appellant was not arrested, but released. In July, 
Detective Nelson received a letter from the Appellant requesting 
his wallet because his identification was in the wallet. 
Detective Nelson testified that he sent Mr. Knight his wallet 
because no charges had been filed against Mr. Knight and there 
seemed to be no legal reason to keep his items (T. I at 102). 
Detective Nelson testified that there was no case against the 
Appellant until November 1984 when Jeff Richens agreed to 
testify against Mr. Knight in his plea arrangement (T. I at 103). 
Georgia Moore, an acquaintance of the Appellant 
Johnnie Knight and of Jeffery Richens, testified that Richens 
and Knight came to her apartment at about 10:00 a.m. to use the 
telephone and stayed for at most one hour (T. I at 113-114). 
She testified that the next time she saw the Appellant was 
the following day at the University of Utah. She said that 
Mr. Knight asked her to be his alibi for the preceding day 
because he was being investigated for a robbery which he did not 
commit, that he had been with his girlfriend but he did not 
want his wife to find out (T. I at 115). Ms. Moore testified 
that she agreed to be Appellant's alibi and repeated this lie 
several times to investigators (T. I at 115-117). During the 
month of May, Ms. Moore contacted the investigating detective 
and told him that her alibi had been a lie (T. I at 117-118). 
Ms. Moore acknowledged under cross-examination that she did 
not retract her alibi until after the Moore family and the 
Johnnie Knight family had had a falling out over unrelated 
matters (T. II at 26-35). The hostility between the Moores 
and the Knights became so intense that Georgia Moore sent 
Johnnie Knight a letter which said in part, "John, Kenny's 
back at the point. You'll be seeing him soon. Say hi for 
me" (T. II at 34). It was at this point that Ms. Moore told 
police that she was lying about the alibi. 
Walter Moore, Georgia's estranged husband, was a 
surprise witness flown into Salt Lake City from Montana the 
morning of his testimony (see argument Point I). Mr. Moore 
testified that on the day of the robbery he had gotten home 
from his classes at Utah Technical College at approximately 
1:40 p.m. (T. II at 91). About twenty minutes later he 
received a telephone call from the Appellant, Johnnie Knight, 
who said that he and Jeff Richens had had car trouble and 
asked Mr. Moore to pick them up at a small grocery store on 
Redwood Road (T. II at 93). Mr. Moore said he agreed and drove 
to the store and picked up Knight and Richens (T. II at 94). 
He testified that Knight and Richens asked him to drive by the 
car to make sure it was all right, which he did (T. II at 94). 
Mr. Moore recognized the car as that of Jeff Richens (T. II at 
94) . 
After hearing this evidence, the jury returned a 
verdict of guilty as to the Appellant, Johnnie Knight. The 
jury returned a verdict of not guilty as to the co-defendant, 
Joseph Ridlon, even though the primary witness against both 
defendants was Jeff Richens, who equally implicated both 
defendants. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Appellant urges this court to reverse his conviction 
for a number of related reasons. The prosecution's failure to 
comply with the written request for discovery, when by letter 
they had agreed to do so, started the chain of errors. To 
his detriment the Appellant reasonably relied upon written 
representation from the County Attorney's Office that all 
information requested had been supplied. 
The court erred in allowing the testimony of Georgia 
and Walter Moore, when the state had not provided either their 
addresses, once their locations had become known to the State, 
or their prior statements. 
The court further erred in denying a motion for a 
mistrial because of the surprise witnesses and denying subsequent 
motions for a continuance, for severance, and for permission of 
Appellant's counsel to withdraw, where she claimed she had not 
and could not represent the Appellant effectively where she was 
unprepared for the surprise witnesses and had badly advised 
Appellant regarding a plea offer in light of the newly disclosed 
evidence. 
Finally, Appellant's right to a fair and impartial 
trial was compromised by several references by witnesses and 
the judge himself regarding the prisoner/inmate status of the 
Appellant. The court erred in denying motions for a mistrial 
on these bases. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THE STATE'S WITHHOLDING OF PRE-TRIAL STATE-
MENTS MADE BY TWO KEY WITNESSES AND THE 
SURPRISE CALLING OF THOSE WITNESSES VIOL-
ATED THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL 
AND RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
At trial, the State called Georgia Moore as a witness. 
Ms. Moore testified that for several months she had provided 
an alibi for Appellant, telling police that Mr. Knight had been 
in her apartment drinking coffee at the time the robbery was 
committed. At some point in July 1983 Ms. Moore changed her 
mind, and told Detective Nelson that she had lied about the 
alibi. On cross-examination Ms. Moore said that Detective 
Ron Nelson arranged for her to make a statement to the County 
Attorney, which she did in July (T. I at 118-119). Because 
this was the first information defense counsel had about a 
statement to the prosecutor, defense counsel immediately 
objected and said that she would not feel comfortable pro-
ceeding with the cross-examination until she had read the 
statement (T. I at 119). The prosecutor, Mr. McKelvie, 
responded that he had no knowledge whether the statement was 
either recorded or transcribed (Id..) . 
After trial had adjourned for the day, Brad Adamson 
of the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office gave defense counsel, 
Jo Carol Nesset-Sale, a copy of the statement made to him by Ms. 
Moore, in which she stated her alibi for Appellant was a lie. 
During a telephone conversation that evening, Mr. Adamson told 
Ms. Nesset-Sale that he would look through his file to see 
if he had anything else that she did not have. He then asked 
her if she had a statement by Walt Moore, the then estranged 
husband of Georgia Moore. Ms. Nesset-Sale replied that she 
did not have the statement, so Mr. Adamson brought her a copy 
of it. The contents of that statement (as set out under the 
testimony of Walt Moore in the Facts statement) were a total 
surprise to defense counsel and extremely damaging to the 
defense of the Appellant (T. II at 2) . 
At trial, defense counsel not only learned of these 
statements for the first time, but she also learned for the 
first time that the prosecution had located and subpoenaed Walt 
and Georgia Moore. Prior to trial, both the prosecution and the 
defense had tried unsuccessfully several times to locate the 
Moores. Defense counsel knew that the Moores were potential 
witnesses, but because Mr. McKelvie had told her as late as 
the Friday before the trial that the State's subpoenas had been 
returned as undeliverable, Ms. Nesset-Sale did not plan her 
defense in anticipation of the Moore's presence. This latter 
point is of minor significance because defense counsel was kept 
uninformed of what the testimony of the Moores would be, the 
county attorney neither providing an address for Mr. or Mrs. 
Moore, once each had been located, nor making available to 
defense counsel their prior statements, both of which had 
been requested in discovery under Rule 16 of the Utah Code 
of CriminaJ Procedure, compliance with which the prosecutor 
had conceded in his secretary's letter. (See Addendum A). 
Defense counsel made a motion for mistrial (T. II at 4), which 
was denied (T. II at 11). Counsel then made a motion to continue 
until the afternoon (T. II at 11) which, although no objection 
was voiced by the prosecution, was likewise denied by Judge Dee. 
In an early ruling on what nondisclosures by a prosecutor 
violate due process, the United States Supreme Court in Mooney v. 
Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) stated: 
It is a requirement that cannot be 
deemed to be satisfied by mere notice 
and hearing if a State has contrived 
a conviction through the pretense of 
a trial which in truth is but used as 
a means of depriving a defendant of 
liberty through a deliberate deception 
of court and jury by the presentation of 
testimony known to be perjured. Such 
a contrivance by a State to procure the 
conviction and imprisonment of a defendant 
is as inconsistent with the rudimentary 
demands of justice as is the obtaining 
of a like result by intimidation. 
The holding of Mooney was extended in Napue v. Illinois/ 360 U.S. 
264, 269 (1959): "The same result obtains when the state, although 
not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when 
it appears." The obligation of the state to correct false evidence 
referred to in Napue should apply to correcting the evidence with 
defense counsel as well as with the court. The statement of 
Georgia Moore, saying that she had lied about the Appellant's 
alibi clearly should have been provided to the defense even 
without a request, under Napue. The Court clarified its Mooney 
and Napue stand in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 37 (1963) by 
stating: 
The principle of Mooney v. Holohan is 
not punishment of society for misdeeds 
of a prosecutor but avoidance of an 
unfair trial to the accused. Society 
wins not only when the guilty are 
convicted but when criminal trials 
are fair; our system of the admin-
istration of justice suffers when 
any accused is treated unfairly. 
Appellant contends that his due process right to a fair 
trial had been violated by the state's withholding of the statements 
of Georgia and Walt Moore as well as the surprise calling of those 
witnesses. 
A. THE STATE VOLUNTARILY AGREED TO 
TURN OVER TO THE DEFENSE ALL STATEMENTS 
OF WITNESSES, WHICH PROMISE WAS RELIED 
UPON BY THE DEFENSE, AND THEREFORE THE 
STATE SHOULD BE ESTOPPED FROM DENYING 
ITS OBLIGATION ON THE BASIS THAT SUCH 
OBLIGATION IS NOT REQUIRED BY STATUTE. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-35-16 (1953 as amended) dealing with 
discovery states: 
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(a) Except as otherwise provided, the 
prosecutor shall disclose to the defense 
upon request the following material or 
information of which he has knowledge: 
(1) Relevant written or recorded state-
ments of the defendant or co-defendants; 
(2) The criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) Physical evidence seized from the 
defendant or co-defendant; 
(4) Evidence known to the prosecutor that 
tends to negate the guilt of the accused, 
mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or 
mitigate the degree of the offense for 
reduced punishment; and 
(5) Any other item of evidence which the 
court determines on good cause shown should 
be made available to the defendant in order 
for the defendant to adequately prepare his 
defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures 
as soon as practicable following the filing of 
charges and before the defendant is required to 
plead. The prosecutor has a continuing duty to 
make disclosure. 
(g) If at any time during the course of the 
proceedings it is brought to the attention -of 
the court that a party has failed to comply with 
this rule, the court may order such party to 
permit the discovery or inspection, grant a 
continuance, or prohibit the party from intro-
ducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter 
such other orders as it deems just under the 
circumstances. 
Appellant concedes that the statements of Walt and Georgia 
Moore were inculpatory in nature and therefore the state was not 
required by statute to provide the statements short of a court order 
requiring them to do so. Utah Code Ann. §77-35-16(a)(5). For 
this reason, the Appellant's counsel filed a timely pre-trial 
motion to discover. (See Addendum B) . Included in this motion 
was a request for an order to disclose: "A, A list of all the 
witnesses the state intends to call for trial, their addresses 
and telephone numbers," and "B. Any recordings, reports, transcripts, 
or reports about statements in possession of any member, or group 
involved in the prosecution or the investigation of the . . . case 
taken from the witnesses listed in point 2A above." A hearing on 
this motion to discovery was set for February 8, 1985, before 
Judge David Dee. Notice of the hearing was delivered to the 
County Attorney's Office. (See Addendum C). 
Soon after the motion had been filed and the hearing 
set, defense counsel contacted the County Attorney's Office to 
see if they would be willing to voluntarily comply with the 
discovery request, without having to obtain a court order. The 
County Attorney's Office agreed to turn over the information in 
voluntary compliance with the motion to discover. Within approx-
imately two days defense counsel received a letter addressed to 
her from the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office confirming the 
agreement. It stated, "Re: JOHNNIE KNIGHT, Motion to Discover— 
Dear Jo Carol: Enclosed you will find the requested information 
on the above subject. If we can be of any further assistance 
please let us know." This letter was signed by a secretary, Joan 
Binkerd. (See Addendum A ) . The letter did not say that certain 
parts of the motion to discover would be complied with while other 
parts would not. It did not contain any conditions at all. The 
reasonable conclusion drawn from this letter was that the office 
was complying with the provisions of the motion to discover. 
Acting in reliance on this promise, and believing that she had 
been given all previous statements that possible witnesses had 
made, defense counsel withdrew her motion to discover; therefore, 
no court order was obtained. However, as counsel learned at trial, 
she had not received the statement made by Georgia Moore that 
indicated that she had lied in providing Mr, Knight's alibi; 
counsel had not received the statement of Walt Moore which put 
Johnnie Knight with Jeff Richens minutes after the robbery on 
Redwood Road, telephoning and asking him for a ride home, and 
later asking him to drive past the car Appellant and Richens 
had just abandoned. 
The defendant's request for discovery was specific, 
clearly worded to inform the county attorney of exactly what was 
being requested. The U.S. Supreme Court dealt with a very similar 
situation in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). In 
Agurs, the appellant argued that the prosecution's failure to 
inform him of the criminal record of his alleged murder victim 
violated his right to a fair trial. The Supreme Court held that 
the prosecutor's failure to so inform the defense did not deny 
the appellant his right to a fair trial because the defense 
counsel had not requested the information, the information 
was not material to any defense to the crime and because there 
was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant even if the 
omitted information had been admitted into evidence. The court 
described the obligation of the prosecution when information is 
requested, stating: 
In Brady the request was specific. 
It gave the prosecutor notice of 
exactly what the defense desired. 
Although there is, of course, no 
duty to provide defense counsel 
with unlimited discovery of every-
thing known by the prosecutor, if 
the subject matter of such a request 
is material, or indeed if a substantial 
basis for claiming materiality exists, 
it is reasonable to require the 
prosecutor to respond either by 
furnishing the information or by 
submitting the problem to the trial 
judge. When the prosecutor receives 
a specific and relevant request, the 
failure to make any response is seldom, 
if ever, excusable. 
Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106. Although Agurs dealt with potentially 
exculpatory evidence, the same reasoning should clearly hold true 
where the prosecutor has voluntarily promised to turn over all 
statements, inculpatory as well as exculpatory, made by witnesses 
the state intends to call. If the prosecutor had decided not to 
comply with his promise, he should have so informed defense counsel 
because "the failure to make any response is seldom, if ever, 
excusable." (Id..) . 
In addition to the basic issue of the fairness of the 
resulting surprise testimony to the defendant, there are extremely 
important practical policy reasons why this Court should not 
tolerate behavior of the type exhibited by the prosecution in this 
case. Agreements and promises between prosecutors and defense 
attorneys are an integral part of our criminal justice system. 
With the current backlog of motions, hearings, and trials in 
our state courts, it has become a practical necessity for 
prosecutors and defense attorneys alike to rely on the promises 
of their opponent rather than go through the protracted process 
of obtaining court orders, at least when such cooperation is 
feasible. While it is not contended by the Appellant that the 
prosecutor's withholding of statements which he had agreed to 
turn over to the defense was purposeful or intentional, the 
effect of the prosecutor's actions is to erode the confidence of 
defense counsel in such informal agreements. This erosion of 
confidence in informal agreements can only lead to a substantial 
increase in the number of formal court motions filed and hearings 
set. Therefore, it is in the interest of all to maintain at least 
a threshhold level of trust in the integrity of the opponent party 
where agreements have been voluntarily entered into. 
B. KNOWLEDGE OF STATEMENTS IN THE HANDS 
OF ANY PART OF THE PROSECUTION TEAM IS 
CHARGED TO THE PROSECUTION. 
In partial response to defense counsel's objection to 
the surprise statements and testimony of Georgia and Walt Moore, 
Mr. McKelvie, the deputy county attorney prosecuting the case, 
responded that he had had no knowledge of the existence of Walt 
Moore's statement until that morning. He stated: 
Apparently Sergeant Adamson from our 
office had an interview with Mr. Moore 
in January of this year while Carvel 
Harward from our office was the pros-
ecutor on this case. When Mr. Harward 
went to Davis County I was assigned the 
case, and as far as I knew all the infor-
mation I had was contained in the file that 
Mr. Harward gave me. 
(T. II at 5). Brad Adamson, referred to by Mr. McKelvie as 
Sergeant Adamson, is an investigator employed by the County 
Attorney's Office, as well as a police officer. It was Mr. 
Adamson who took the statements of Walt and Georgia Moore. 
It is clear that even if the prosecutor, Mr. McKelvie, 
did not have the statements personally, the statements are to 
be treated as in his possession if they are in the possession 
of any member of the prosecution team. In State v. Shabata, 678 
P.2d 785, 788 (Utah 1984), this Court, citing Barbee v. Warden, 
331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964), stated: 
At the outset, we stress that we are 
concerned with more than the prosecutor's 
state of knowledge. . . . Information 
known to police officers working on the 
case is charged to the prosecution since 
the officers are part of the prosecution 
team. Neither the prosecutor nor officers 
working on a case may withhold exculpatory 
evidence or evidence valuable to a defendant. 
The important question here is whether the 
defendant was prejudiced by the prosecutions 
failure to disclose [the requested information]. 
For purposes of this question, the good or bad 
faith of the prosecutor is irrelevant. "If 
the suppression of evidence results in consti-
tutional error, it is because of the character 
of the evidence, not the character of the 
prosecutor." (Citations omitted). 
While State v. Shabata dealt with potentially exculpatory 
evidence, the case certainly stands for principle that the knowledge 
and evidence of any part of the prosecution team is charged to the 
prosecutor personally. Therefore, the fact that Mr. McKelvie did 
not personally have the statements until the day of the testimony 
of Walt and Georgia Moore was irrelevant. The County Attorneyfs 
investigator had the statements, and testimony in accordance with 
those statements was elicited by Mr. McKelvie. 
Regarding the whereabouts of Georgia and Walt Moore, at 
some point in advance of the day of trial, the prosecution learned 
of their locations, yet failed to notify the defendant although 
the duty to comply with disclosures is a continuing duty. The 
state knew sufficiently in advance to arrange air travel for Mr. 
Moore from Montana yet did not attempt to notify defense counsel 
until the trial began. 
C. THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO 
DELIVER THE REQUESTED STATEMENTS AS 
AGREED RENDERED THE APPELLANT'S COUNSEL 
INEFFECTIVE. 
•• At - .ipf.*. - --.." '-s counsel requestea chat vva.^ 
Moore not be allowed to testify because his prior statements 
had not bpen provided !• her rind sh«»IP I . ' -as unprepaied 
to cross-examine Mr, Moore and the surprise had substantially 
prejudiced Mr Knight'^ defense, Th i s mo+ 'or was denied (T. II 
a I Defc ade a motj : • :: 01 itinue the trial 
for a few hours -; nar sne- -M-. - discuss the new evidence with 
h e r c l i e n t r p r e p a r ~ *• - r-~' , .:ri -:* Dee si immari II i 
denied the A^ . ma* y, aefense counsel 
made \ motion thdraw counsel because the statements of 
w 
effectively represent the defendant during the 'rial ^iven r.ne 
court's refusal to exclude Walt Moore's testimony or rrant a 
ironl. i uudiM i • IT II ill I " I This motion was also denied (Id.) . 
The United States Supreme Court addressed effectiveness 
of counsel in two recent compain on rvise.s I i, ^ o f I" h o . s i •.'i.or-'.s , 
Strickland v. Washington, ___ U.S. _ _ , MO L, Ed 2d 67 4 ( i ,:)H 4) , 
the court considered a claim, of ineffectiveness of counsel where 
the dpfV • I lad h :i nisei f • •' i ' •* J 
assistance by simply failing to render adequate Legai jssisi.arce. 
* •h^ other case. United States v. Cronic, U.S. _ , 104 S 
irt re so 1 ved a c 1 a iin o f i ne £ f ect ivene s s :) f 
counsel v/here the government violated the defendant's right to 
counsel by interferring with the abi 1 1 1 c • " tsel to 1 
independent decisions about how to conduc; : ..^  defense. is 
this latter type of ineffectiveness of counsel that Appellant 
claims. 
In Cronic/ the appellant was charged in connection 
with a "check kiting" scheme. Shortly before trial his attorney 
withdrew from the case. The trial court appointed a young lawyer 
with a real estate practice to represent the defendant, despite 
the fact the attorney had never participated in a jury trial. 
The attorney was allowed twenty-five days for pre-trial investigation, 
even though it had taken the government four and one-half years to 
investigate the case and review thousands of documents. The Supreme 
Court held that the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals had erred in 
finding a per se violation of the defendant's right to effective 
assistance of counsel, without requiring some evidence of actual 
prejudice at the trial. The Court stated that prejudice cannot 
be merely inferred, although "[t]here are . . . circumstances that 
are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating 
their effect in a particular case is unjustified." (.Id. at 667). 
The Court then pointed out that it ". . . has uniformly found 
constitutional error without any showing of prejudice when 
counsel was wither totally absent, or prevented from assisting 
the accused during a critical stage of the proceedings." (Id., 
footnote 25 at 668). The Appellant herein, Johnnie Knight, contends 
that his attorney's reliance on the promise of the prosecutor and 
resulting failure to follow through with the Motion to Discover, 
violated his right to effective assistance of counsel during the 
pre-trial stage and his trial. The actions of the prosecutor, in 
recanting by effect his promise to provide all statements and 
and dd(1 resses nil w i f D P -IS* »S [ ir^VPii I ei I defense i niunse] truni 
adequately advising the Appellant during the plea process, 
as well as preventing defense counsel from formulating an 
adequate defense, Appel LdMl. .'MI! be*1!! ulfered HI plea bargain 
in which he could have plead r..> a tnird degree felony. With 
trie o^Iv known incriminating, evidence being the testimony uf; 
L, e :.: ;. Lchens , a convicted t eion , defense counsel f s advice 
to defendant was considerably different than it would have been 
Y • . •• U n i t -ii n l • 
George -J -n.^i - i 
The nnit-^n states Supreme Court has recognized that the 
2 assistance o ii 
counsel. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S . /r>9 {1 47(11 11 was 
because oi * • • ?nee nf effpr5 . ,,, . , I i 
the Court upheld the constitutionality ^i ^he jica bargaining 
in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 .. . - m o Bordenkircher 
\ Hayes X L \„ JL a . * erated 
i. the standard r 
voluntar iness 
a 1 Let in j L in/ 
Court held that a guilt 
if voluntarii • • 
simultaneous! i_ . ___ 
counsel insu: . 
Similarly ,- , .rdenJcii .^  i _..___ —*_ - • d 
that it is M + . --io^a+. . .•,. >f due process for prosecutor to 
threaten tw charge CJ Lix^ laiicst extent UiaL ne can JL£ the accused 
; i -juilty plea depends upon the 
, nfn] 1 ; MO- . • choice amoncf the 
lei-jnaai. .. -.lford 
* tea to a lesser offense cai :* accepted 
Tf-r+lv made, ~^ ^ ": -n the defendant 
. ..... . -ocence. lJ.iv.^ :. l^e assistance of 
.t. \> lea decis.. -)n * . . -i 'nade • ritel 11 cent/1; v . 
does not accept an offered plea bargain. The Court premised this 
holding on the existence of competent, informed defense counsel 
advising the accused during the plea process. 
Under circumstances, it is clear that defense counsel 
was rendered ineffective by the state's failure to provide the 
full discovery it had agreed to supply, and the resulting 
inadequate advice regarding the plea bargain, and inadequate 
advocacy at trial. In a criminal justice system where plea 
bargains are an accepted practice, situations, such as the present 
one, arise in which a defendant's best course of action is a 
guilty plea to a lesser offense, even where innocence is 
maintained and the plea entered under Alford, supra. Therefore, 
it is as important that a plea of innocent be intelligently 
made as it is for a plea of guilty to be intelligently made. 
At trial, defense counsel also had to contend with the 
co-defendant's strategy which became very hostile towards the 
defendant in response to the Moore's testimony (see Point II). 
In light of the foregoing, and in light of the trial court's refusal 
to take any corrective steps whatsoever, the Appellant contends 
that the actions of the state have denied him his fifth, sixth, 
and fourteenth amendment rights to a fair trial and effective 
assistance of counsel. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR MISTRIAL WHEN 
IT BECAME CLEAR THAT THE DEFENDANT WOULD 
SUFFER PREJUDICE FROM A JOINT TRIAL WITH 
THE CO-DEFENDANT. 
At the close of the first day of trial defense counsel 
learned ;r the first 4 i ru -ho*- W i - Moore had been ! ocated in 
witness o< following day ; o ! nis was also the 
first time that defense counsel was provided with statements 
made by Wa 1 t a i id Georgia Moore t:.o toe county attorney *s 
investigate r everal months previously fter trial had 
adjourned 101 f ay HOP rn»defn-<J- . , ,. . 
defendar* fs counse. that he intendec i at-jutr , :i closing argu-
ment that • T. fi Richens and the defendant committed 
the ' i , pi 1 
involve * - - This riad not been the planned defense 
of the co-defendant, • when -it was discovered that Wa ] t a nd 
(•'.-• - - :.
 % • -ch a way as to cieai +.» 
implicate Appellaro our :xo his co-defendant, trie co-defendant's 
counse efrsi 
Accordingly , .. counsel for Appellant filed 
a motion for * ;str a! based r>n * 'N- substantial prejudice the 
dei <*r - • - ..< wi 1:1: 1 bl i = co -defendant 
foi t r wi it 85-86 .-is 'not.i- •• was denied (T. II at 
88) . 
§77-35-9 (d) (1953 -is amended) requires thcii nation + > scv-r be 
filed * -ir- ^:— --r before t o 
was . ../ *. .-. ase because pri;:; to. o, ,^L ...ere appeared 
be . as is : ! ;r: r ;,*. statements n: \viH -<- Georgia 
Mo< - •- * • , . ses 
planned by the defendant and co-defendant were not mutually 
-, 9 1 
antagonistic. Counsel for both defendant and co-defendant told 
Judge Dee that if they had been provided with the statements of 
Walt and Georgia Moore before trial, they would have separately 
filed a timely motion to sever (T. II at 83-84, 86). Thus the 
motion for mistrial was based on the prejudice to the defendant 
in not having his trial severed. This motion for mistrial was 
based on the misconduct of the prosecution, and this argument 
is not precluded from appeal by Utah Code Ann. §77-35-9 (d) 
requiring a timely pre-trial motion to sever. Alternatively, if 
this Court views this argument as one of abuse of discretion in 
refusing to sever, it would deny the Appellant due process of the 
law to preclude this argument from appeal based on the procedural 
requirements of Utah Code Ann. §77-35-9(d) where the failure to 
file a timely motion to sever was due to misconduct on the part 
of the prosecution. 
The Utah statute regarding joinder and severance of 
defendants is Utah Code Ann. §77-35-9 (1953 as amended). The 
applicable sections state: 
(b) Two or more defendants may be 
charged in the same indictment or infor-
mation if they are alleged to have par-
ticipated in the same act or conduct in 
the same criminal episode. Such defendants 
may be charged in one or more counts 
together or separately and all of the 
defendants need not be charged in each 
account. When two or more defendants are 
jointly charged with any offense, they 
shall be tried jointly unless the court 
in its discretion, on motion or otherwise, 
orders separate trials consistent with the 
interests of justice. (emphasis added). 
(d) If it appears that a defendant or the 
prosecution is prejudiced by the joinder of 
offenses or defendants in an indictment or 
information, or by a joinder for trial 
toaether, the court shall order an election 
of separate trials of separate counts, 
or grant a severance of defendants, or 
provide such other relief as justice 
requires. 
In
 State v. Rivenburg: *~ -< *, 
f)9H (Utah i960), th i s Court stated: 
When two or more defendants are jointly 
charged with any offense, they shall be 
tried jointly, unless the court in its 
discretion orders separate trials. If 
the ruling of the court deprives the 
defendant of a fair trial, then the 
judge has abused his discretion. The 
discretion may not be exercised arbi-
trarily, 
. In State v. Collins, 612 P. 2d 77 5, 7 ,' / (Utah 1980), 
tnis court c 1 a ri f i <M1 f 1 ir-> Rivenburgh sf . i m 1 «I 
The trial court must, when defendants are 
charged jointly, weigh possible prejudice 
to any defendant with considerations of 
economy and practicalities of judicial 
administration. Doubts concerning pre-
judice should be resolved by the trial 
court in favor of a defendant, but the 
trial court must be accorded some dis-
cretion in denying a motion for severance. 
A denial will be reversed by this Court 
only if a defendant's right to a fair 
trial has been impaired. 
I n
 Collins, the refusal lo reverse the lower court's denial of 
severance was based on two reasons: 
A substantial part of the evidence and 
testimony offered by the State was relevant 
to charges against each of the defendants 
. . . . Equally important, none of the 
defenses of either accused was antagonistic 
to the interests of any co-defendant. Id, 
In the present case, had the statemr r ' % ' ••••• •-^•••••- 3 
of the witnesses beei I known prior to tri a1 . *" < . „ ..-a. •.:ouri 
would have been warranted in severing the co-defendants for both 
« ? i -
of the reasons listed in Collins, The co-defendant, Joseph 
Ridlon, would have argued that severance was necessary because 
the highly damaging testimony of Walt and Georgia Moore which, 
in many ways, corroborated the testimony of Jeff Richens, 
pertained only to the defendant, Johnnie Knight (T. II at 83-84). 
The Appellant, Johnnie Knight, would have argued that severance 
was necessary because the co-defendant, Ridlon, was going to 
implicate Mr, Knight as his defense (T. II at 85-86). 
The denial of the motion for mistrial and the surprise 
testimony of the Moores resulted in substantial actual prejudice 
to Appellant. The testimony of the Moores was very damaging to 
the Appellant but did not even mention the co-defendant, Ridlon. 
Therefore the co-defendant argued that it was Appellant and Jeff 
Richens who committed the crime. This theory of the case was 
exemplified by the following passage in the co-defendantfs closing 
argument: 
What happened here, as the case started to 
unfold, it started to get clear to me that 
what happened was, and I'm looking at the 
testimony of the victims, Teresa Jensen and 
Bruce Andersen, two individuals came in and 
robbed the place. Mr. Andersen indicated 
that one was about 6 foot and one was about 
5 10. Jeff Richens testified that he's 5 11 
and a half, something in that range. Jeff 
Richens was in there robbing the place, and 
he was in there with Johnnie Knight. He and 
Johnnie Knight were together that entire day. 
They were in their vehicle together phoning 
up people to come and rescue, telling people 
their car was broken down, figuring out an 
alibi together and sticking with that alibi 
until one of them gets in a jam, can't get 
out of it, and finally fesses up. 
Why does Richens bring Ridlon into this 
matter? I don't know. But you heard the 
testimony of Chris Laub. And Chris is the 
kind of individual you're going to want 
around if you're ever robbed because he 
pays attention. And he was following these 
robbers, followed them to the car, wrote 
down the license number. And he's the 
only person that saw the driver. In fact 
he saw the driver exit the vehicle, lift 
up the seat, I guess, and allow someone 
to get in. He testified he thinks he 
remembers stating to the police at that 
time or shortly thereafter that he was 
almost positive that the driver was a 
female. And that's the person that Mr. 
Richens is txyi rig to protect. 
The Moores take the stand and they corr-
oborate Jeff, and they talk about the fact 
that he did in fact call them right after 
this robbery and ask them for some help, 
an alibi, a ride, whatnot. They never even 
heard of Joseph Ridlon. They never mentioned 
his name nor did they ever look for Joseph 
Ridlon. The entire conversations they 
alluded to were between Jeff Richens and 
Johnnie Knight. 
(j.-. ±± at 
I4: . .- •. .•-•"»•"• -^i 4- Appellant had *"~ defend himself not 
only from, the accusations r r •-*-..-. r>rosecuf * •* f,r , uie 
c , . iiih.ii J I In . - - i . on was 
fundamentally unfair, and the type warrant mo severance of; nnaL 
accord ing to State v. Co 11 ins , supra. it snu , i •• *• :t 
i .1 le defense strategy of the co-defendant Mr . dioi • imp., i -
eating the defendant was wholly successful. Although Jeff 
Richenr -r * ~ated both -- • as ace | in i f; I e :1 
and t;;. Jeicr;aarf Appellant herein, was convicted. Under 
these circumstances, tiv- Appellant- contends that "* * a 
v:i c ] a t:i: • le trial 
coi r \ ler1 M S riotx^.i *" >: .mstrial, ana compel hi." ':." proceed 
a-*- rr*,T"1 w • V- " -defendant whosr defense was nxyhl' , tagoi: :i i sti c 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
DECLARE MISTRIAL AFTER EVIDENCE HAD 
BEEN ADMITTED STATING THAT THE APPELLANT 
HAD BEEN IN PRISON AND ON PAROLE AT THE 
TIME OF HIS ARREST. 
The Appellant chose to remain silent at trial rather 
than taking the stand. Therefore there was no basis for the 
jury to be informed that Mr. Knight had been in prison in the 
past, and was on parole at the time of his arrest. This infor-
mation could only be prejudicial in painting the Appellant as 
a bad person. The information was in no way relevant to the 
charges against Appellant. Yet, on at least three separate 
occasions, the jury heard statements (one from the trial judge) 
that the Appellant had been in prison, was currently on parole 
and incarcerated. Objections were timely made after each of these 
instances and motions for mistrials were argued. 
In the first of these instances, defense counsel asked 
Jeff Richens if John Shephard was Richensf parole agent. The 
question lent itself to a yes or no answer, but Richens responded, 
"He [John Shephard] was — he was Johnnie Knight's parole agent 
at that time, and I believe that is the time they started switching 
me from one to another" (T. II at 75). Defense counsel immediately 
objected on the grounds that this answer was nonresponsive to 
the question and made prejudicial information available to the 
jury which otherwise would not be available. Outside the 
presence of the jury defense counsel made a motion for mistrial 
based on this prejudicial answer (T. II at 81). This motion was 
denied (T. II at 83). 
-?6-
In the second instance, after court had adjourned but 
* - * ] d 11 le p r I son trans-
portdti. r. nicei M*-< the men back by 1:30"., unmistakable 
reference * • •=> defendant's incarceration. Defense co , 
cs jji-i !iria«. mistrial outside the presence o;. :..,<_ 
jury, where the following exchange occurred between counsel, 
Judge Dee, and tra,nsportat: :i oi i off i cer Ton;; Ka ssapaki s : 
MS. NESSET-SALE: Oh. I'm sorry. One 
other thing I need to make on the record. 
It's come to my attention from my client 
and the transportation officer that as 
the court adjourned and left the bench 
you indicated to Tony, the transportation 
officer, who was seated at the rear of 
the courtroom to have the men back by 
1:30, a clear reference to their being 
-incarcerated. Of course Tony sits in 
the back of the courtroom so that is 
not brought to the jury's attention. 
They dress in civilian clothes so that • 
is not a factor which comes to the 
attention of the jury. And I think 
the Court making that remark was 
improper, and I would again TTV>V„ r >r 
a mistrial on that basis. 
THE COURT: No. Denied. The 4:;-v was 
out of the box. 
MS. NESSET-SALE: Out of . 
THE COURT: You bet. 
MS. NESSET-SALE: Then I wou] <: 
THE COURT: Out. Letfs go. 
MS. NESSET-SALE: May I - - one more tn* ^ 
I need to say on the record. I believe if 
Tony - - I would proffer that if Tony - -
I'm sorry, Tony. What is your last na^ < 
TRANSPORTATION OFFICER: Kassapakis. 
MS. NESSET-SALE: - - Kassapakis were called 
to testify at a hearing on the motion for a 
mistrial that he would say that a majority 
of the jurors were still within the court-
room, clearly within earshot, in the area 
of the jury box. Is that correct, Tony? 
TRANSPORTATION OFFICER: That's correct, 
THE COURT: They were out of the box and 
walking ou' What are you doing, calling 
me a liar? 
TRANSPORTS! I i . ,-. , , i not, Your 
Honor. 
IT I I at 8 8-89) . 
Whether the jurors were in the jury box or out of the jury box 
is of little consequence. The point is, wherever in the court-
room they were, the jurors could and did hear the remark of the 
judge. 
Finally the third improper remark was made by Walt 
Moore as he was being questioned by defense counsel: 
Q: You'd known [Johnnie Knight] for how long? 
A: Just a few months before that when he got 
out of prison. 
(T. II at 107). Defense counsel immediately objected (I<d.) and 
made a motion for mistrial (T. II at 119). This motion, like 
the others, was denied (T. II at 121) . 
Many cases have held that the jurors1 conscious or 
subconscious connection of the defendant as a jail inmate is 
so highly prejudicial as to warrant a new trial. In Estelle v. 
Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976), the United States Supreme Court 
held that a state cannot compel a defendant to stand trial in 
identifiable prison clothes. Although in that case the Court 
found that there was no constitutional violation where defense 
counsel had failed to object, the Court viewed forcing a defendant 
to wear prison clothes to be an abridgement of his fundamental 
rights to due process and equal protection of the law. The Court 
further stated that the perception of the defendant created in 
the jurors1 minds after seeing the defendant in prison clothes 
violates the presumption of innocence of the accused. The 
Court stated: 
The potential effects of presenting an 
accused before the jury in prison attire 
need not, however, be measured in the 
abstract. Courts have, with few excep-
tions, determined that an accused should 
not be compelled to go to trial in 
prison or jail clothing because of the 
possible impairment of the presumption 
so basic to the adversary system. 
(Citations omitted). 
Id. •!*• 504. 
'?* * * Supreme i * ? *• • he 
prejacic .a. eriect o i ^ iror.. • u-acea vvi^ i: uir* jror^ identify 
the defendant as being : \i - r <^ - ^ ^ in "hes^ 
SmiL, 6] 7 P 2 . • iS<-
a wr: i. u i habeas corpus , scati ng : 
The prejudicial effect that flows from £ L 
defendant's appearing before a jury in 
identifiable prison garb is not measurable, 
and it is so potentially prejudicial as to 
create a substantial risk of fundamental 
unfairness in a criminal trial. 
Id . at 3 44 . 
T l h III H P i ' I 1 I i i I i M -.(."i II i d j 'O i . ) . { 
seeing a defendant prison clothes, whim sai-els him as 
heme < -.»- * ^H<=-»? nma*-e, and creates the inference in 
1 he is a tau person. he present 
case, the defendant :iu not appear r; : -.: * ::lothes; instea-.i 
there was testimon* ana a states. 
defendant had in prison, wao Ou i/uiu.-., .AI..I was .unently 
being incarcerated. The prejudice result :na ^ ')m arr one *' * hese 
i n ^ tar ----- T. ; •. ; • . • :- — - • • • . ,* . 
to wear ident i :'idjjie pi. :*-<>!! :.:»orhes, bur :ne ;^  p.tinu^ . . reminder over 
time of - %*- defendant1^ ^ri^onpr *=tatu° w.° ^w- vv bit as o^o • ldicial 
a ....• J - . . -nermore, a. though the 
statements ot Jeff Richens and Walt Moore were nade while they 
were being questioned uy defonr-. 
responsive to the questions asked. In no way could the answers 
given have been anticipated by defense counsel. Therefore, the 
trial court's reasoning in refusing to grant the mistrials that 
the answers given were elicited by defense counsel, is illogical. 
For these reasons, Appellant contends that he was denied his right 
to a fair trial. 
CONCLUSION 
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant, 
Johnnie P. Knight, asked this Court to reverse his conviction 
or, alternatively, grant him a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this /J day of October, 1985. 
STESSEJT-J 
-/ ^Jrr-i 
JO CAROL NE E SALE 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, JO CAROL NESSET-SALE, hereby certify that four 
copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief will be delivered to 
the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this C J day of October, 1985. 
[ROL 
/ / ( ^ ^ N y . 
JO CAR NESSET-SALE 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
DELIVERED by 
day of October, 1985. 
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Dear Jo Carol: 
Enclosed you will find the requested information on the above 
subject. If we can be of any further assistance please let 
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Secretary 
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ADDENDUM B 
JO CAROL NESSET-SALE (#2398) 
Attorney for Defendant 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 53 2-5 444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : MOTION TO DISCOVER 
Plaintiff 
-v- : 
JOHNNIE PATRICK KNIGHT, : Case No, CR-85-48 
Judge David B. Dee 
Defendant : 
The Defendant, JOHNNIE PATRICK KNIGHT, by and through 
his attorney of record, JO CAROL NESSET-SALE, pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated §77-35-16 (1953 as amended) and the Due Process 
Clauses of the Constitution of Utah and the United States, 
hereby moves this Court as follows: 
1. For an order pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 
83 (1963), and Utah Code Annotated §77-35-16(a) (4) (1953 as 
amended) requiring the Salt Lake County Attorney to disclose 
evidence that tends to negate the guilt of the defendant, or 
mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree 
of the offense for reduced punishment that has been discovered 
by any member of the agencies involved in the investigation or 
prosecution of the above-entitled case. 
2. For an order pursuant to United States v. Agurs, 
427 U.S. 97 (1976), and Utah Code Annotated §77-35-16(a)(5) 
(1953 as amended) to make the following material evidence 
available to defense counsel for inspection and if desired 
copying or testing. 
A. A list of all the witnesses that the State 
intends to call for trial in the above-entitled matter, their 
addresses and telephone numbers; 
B. Any recordings, reports, transcripts, or reports 
about statements in possession of any member, or group involved 
in the prosecution or the investigation of the above-entitled 
case taken from the witnesses listed in point 2A above. 
C. Any criminal convictions or arrests of those 
individuals listed in points 2A and 2B above; 
D. Any photographs or other demonstrative evidence 
prepared by the County Attorney, its staff, or investigative 
agencies during the course of the investigation of the, above-
entitled case; 
E. Statements made by the Defendant to any of the 
State's witnesses which the prosecution intends to introduce 
against the Defendant at trial and the dates, times, places, 
and persons present when such statements were made; 
F. Any reports, results, or questions asked of any of 
the State's witnesses as listed in point 2A above who have taken 
any form of lie detector test or undergone hypnosis or other 
scientific examination with respect to this case; 
G. Reports and conclusions or any experts that the State 
intends to call for trial, the particular expert's qualifications, 
and any renumeration that the witnesses may be receiving from 
the State of Utah, including but not limited to, any medical 
testimony relating to injuries incurred by the Defendant or 
alleged victim; 
H. Any physical evidence or photographs taken at 
the scene of the alleged crime; 
I. Any police or investigative reports made during 
the course of the investigation or prosecution of this case; 
J. Reports or descriptions of any weapons or other 
physical evidence seized from the Defendant's person or his 
residence or his vehicle that the State intends to use at trial; 
K. Any offers of leniency or plea bargain agreements 
or any other form of renumeration provided to any of the witnesses 
listed in points 2A and 2B above. 
WHEREFORE the Defendant moves that this Court issue an 
Order granting the relief sought. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ day of January, 1985. 
JL 
^C^^<^/^ -~\ *GC< (.; 
JO CAROL NESSET-SALE 
Attorney for Defendant 
DELIVERED/MAILED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt 
Lake County Attorney's Office, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, this &is day of January, 1985. 
<T4 , yfauv.tiiii-J 
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ADDENDUM C 
JO CAROL NESSET-SALE (#2398) 
Attorney for Defendant 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
-v-
JOHNNIE PATRICK KNIGHT, 
Defendant 
NOTICE OF HEARING ON 
MOTION TO DISCOVER 
Case No. CR-85-48 
Judge David B. Dee 
TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 
You and each of you please be advised that the above-
entitled matter will come on regularly for hearing on Friday 
the 8 th day of February 1985, at the hour of 1 : 3 ° P .m., 
before the Honorable David B. Dee, Third District Court Judge-
Please govern yourselves accordingly. 
DATED this sp* day of January, 1985. 
^O 
•<_ c *<*& -5c<^ 
JO^€MOL NESSET-SALE 
Attorney for Defendant 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt 
Lake County Attorney's Office, 231 East Fourth South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, this ^ / / ' - , / i day of January, 1985 
f 
(' j(U(A, '^plU ) 
